Developing Equtiable and Affordable Government Responses to Drought in Australia by Bruce Chapman & Linda Botterill
CENTRE FOR  
ECONOMIC POLICY RESEARCH 
 





Developing Equitable and Affordable Government Responses to 










DISCUSSION PAPER NO. 455 









ISBN: 0 7315 3525 1 
1 Linda Botterill, School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, Canberra Australia. 
E-mail: LINDA.BOTTERILL@ANU.EDU.AU 
2 Bruce Chapman, Economics Program, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, Canberra 
Australia.  
E-mail: Bruce.Chapman @anu.edu.au 
Acknowledgments 
The concept underlying this work was initiated in discussions between Bruce Chapman and Greg Taylor in 1996, and 
the authors are grateful for the input of the latter.  The authors would also like to thank John Chudleigh for his 
generosity and wisdom in discussions of this proposal.  Responsibility for any errors or misunderstandings lies with the 
present authors. 
This paper is based on an earlier version  presented at the Australasian Political Studies Association Conference in 
Canberra from 2-4 October 2002.     
  ii   
CONTENTS 
   Page 
Abstract iii 
Historical and Conceptual Context  1 
A brief history of Commonwealth Government Drought Relief Policy  1 
Is there  a case for Government Involvement?  3 
Problems with the Usual Approaches  4 
The definition of drought  5 
The farm family and the farm business  6 
Structural adjustment  7 
Financing drought relief  8 
An Alternative Approach: Income Related Borrowing  9 
Income related borrowing : conceptual issues  9 
A no charge system  10 
Leaving the system to the market  10 
Income related loans  11 








    
  iii   
ABSTRACT 
Once again in 2002 Australian taxpayers are being called on to provide relief to drought-
affected farmers. Under the National Drought Policy which has been in place since 1992, 
support is provided by the Commonwealth Government predominantly in two forms: 
interest rate subsidies to assist farm businesses and a special welfare payment, the 
Exceptional Circumstances Relief Payment. Support is available under these programs 
only to farmers in geographically defined areas which have been declared to be 
experiencing ‘exceptional circumstances’. This paper describes a number of problems with 
this approach and suggests an alternative form of drought relief based on the Higher 
Education Contribution Scheme, which is more equitable between farmers, less regressive 
in its impact on tax payers, and less open to politicisation.  
 
 Developing Equitable and Affordable Government Responses to 
Drought in Australia 
 
Australia is the driest inhabited continent on earth and also experiences a high degree of 
climate variability.  As such, drought is a frequent occurrence and drought of some 
magnitude is occurring somewhere in the country most of the time.  Since the arrival of 
European-style agriculture, drought has been a recurring problem for Australia’s farmers.  
The impact has been felt well beyond the farm sector.  Although agriculture’s 
contribution to the Australian economy has reduced from 18 per cent of GDP in 1952-53 
to around 3 per cent in 1995-96 (McColl et al. 1997, 21), drought still has a significant 
impact on the overall economy.  In October 2002, the Australian Bureau of Agricultural 
and Resource Economics estimated that the drought would reduce economic growth in 
2002-03 by 0.7 per cent, implying lost output of about $5.4 billion (ABARE 2002).    
 
In May 2002, the agenda for the meeting of the agricultural Ministerial Council included 
consideration of the ‘exceptional circumstances’ program through which support is 
provided to drought-affected farmers.  At the time of writing, the outcome of the meeting 
had not been made public but it is understood that the sticking points were the definition 
of ‘exceptional circumstances’ and the appropriate funding split between the 
Commonwealth and State and Territory governments. 
 
What is now presented is a contribution to this contemporary policy discussion and 
development, and is organised as follows. First, we consider briefly the history of 
Australian drought support policy.  Second, we examine critically the arguments typically 
offered as justifications for government subsidisation of farmers experiencing drought. 
Third, we explore several problems of a political and policy nature related to 
contemporary approaches to drought relief.   Fourth, we consider the cost of drought 
relief and the appropriate means for meeting that cost.   
 
Finally, we offer a novel and alternative approach to the problem, aimed at addressing the 
conceptual, redistribution and practical weaknesses of current policy. This involves the 
suggestion of the use of government-financed loans with the unique feature that 
repayments are required only if and when farm revenues have recovered.  The method 
builds on the foundations underlying the Higher Education Contribution System, which 
in international terms was the first use of income contingent loans to finance university 
charges. A number or implementation issues remain to be explored further, but it is clear 
that considerable potential exists for improvements in drought policy along the lines 
suggested. 
 
Historical and Conceptual Context  
 
A Brief History of Commonwealth Government Drought Relief Policy 
 
The Commonwealth Government has expended large sums on drought relief in recent 
decades.  Between 1992 and 1996 Queensland and New South Wales experienced 





century and the 2002 drought has been described by the Bureau of Meteorology as 
‘remarkable’ for the widespread nature of its impact (BOM 2002).   The following sets 
the historical and conceptual context for Commonwealth Government involvement in the 
provision of drought relief as background to the discussion of the problems with present 
forms of intervention and a possible solution.  For a more detailed history of drought 
policy in Australia, see Botterill (2003 forthcoming).   
 
In policy terms, drought was treated for many years as a natural disaster.  However, in 
1989, the Commonwealth Government decided that drought would no longer be covered 
by the Commonwealth-State Natural Disaster Relief Arrangements.  It is probable that 
the motivation for the decision was budgetary, as drought relief dominated the disaster 
relief budget, accounting for 57.6 per cent of Commonwealth expenditure in this area 
between 1962-63 and 1987-88 (Heathcote 1991, 226).  There were also concerns about 
the misuse of the disaster relief scheme by the Queensland government, with the 
Commonwealth expressing the view that the Queensland government was using the 
scheme ‘as a sort of National Party slush fund’ (Walsh 1989, 189).   
 
The announcement was followed in 1990 with the establishment of a Drought Policy 
Review Task Force (DPRTF) which rejected the concept of drought as a specific, defined 
event based purely on its climatic features, and argued that it was inappropriate to treat it 
as a disaster.  In July 1992 the Commonwealth-State Ministerial Council announced a 
new National Drought Policy based on the principles of self-reliance and risk 
management.  The Council and proposed that the move to this new approach be 
supported through the Rural Adjustment Scheme (RAS), which was at that time under 
review (ACANZ 1992, 13-17).   
 
Rural adjustment schemes have been in operation in some form in Australia since 1935.  
Major reviews occurred in 1971, 1976, 1985, 1988 and 1992.  The post-1975 schemes 
were very similar in format and tended to focus on the financial position of the farmer as 
the primary criterion for support.  The 1992 review led to a refocussing of the scheme 
and a new legislative framework.  The scheme was more market-oriented than its 
predecessors and focused on supporting productivity improvements by farmers with 
long-term, productive futures in agriculture.     
 
However, the major innovation in the 1992 legislation was the introduction of the concept 
of ‘exceptional circumstances’, consistent with the principle in the National Drought 
Policy that, while farmers should prepare for ‘normal’ droughts, there were events for 
which even the best manager could not be expected to anticipate.  Under the new 
provisions the interest rate subsidies offered under the Rural Adjustment Scheme would 
be increased during a period declared to be an exceptional circumstance from a maximum 
50 per cent to a maximum 100 per cent – this has since been phased down to 50 per cent.  
This support was, however, limited to those farmers who would normally qualify for 
support through the scheme, ie ‘those farmers with good prospects for long term 
profitability’ (Crean 1992, 2414).  A major flaw with the new scheme was that 
‘exceptional circumstances’ were not defined in either the legislation or the Second 






In addition to its review of rural adjustment support, in 1992 the Commonwealth also 
undertook a review of its income-smoothing scheme, the Income Equalisation  Deposits 
(IED) Scheme which was an income-smoothing mechanism to provide farmers with a 
mechanism for financial planning to assist risk management.  The IED scheme was 
supplemented by a farm management bonds scheme, withdrawal from which was only 
possible in ‘periods of financial stress caused by factors such as, drought, commodity 
price collapse, severe disease outbreak etc’ (ACANZ 1992, 15).  The IED and farm 
management bonds were both seen as mechanisms for moving farmers to a position of 
self-reliance through the accumulation of financial reserves, a position that it was hoped 
would reduce the need, if not the calls, for government support during dry spells. 
 
The Rural Adjustment Scheme was reviewed in 1997, following which the Minister for 
Primary Industries and Energy announced that it was to be terminated and replaced with a 
new package of farm support measures, with the exceptional circumstances provisions set 
up as a stand-alone program incorporating both the business support element of interest 
rate subsidies and a welfare component in the form of an Exceptional Circumstances 
Relief Payment.  At the same time the Income Equalisation and Farm Management Bond 
Schemes were replaced by a new Farm Management Deposit Scheme.   The philosophy 
of the new scheme remained the same as its predecessors, that is, to provide  a tool for 
farmers to accumulate financial reserves to be drawn down during downturns. 
 
Is There a Case for Government Involvement? 
 
Governments have delivered drought relief to farmers for decades and this has been 
justified in a variety of ways. As noted, until 1989 drought was considered to be a natural 
disaster and this formed the basis of the policy response.  Related to the disaster approach 
has been a concern with the protection of the resource base, including the preservation of 
the breeding herd.  In its 1992 report on a national drought policy, the Senate Standing 
Committee on rural and regional affairs argued that ‘it is in the national interest for the 
Commonwealth Government to protect and maintain Australia’s agricultural base and 
productive capacity, particularly Australia’s breeding herd and flock’ (Senate Standing 
Committee on Rural and Regional Affairs 1992, 69).   Early drought relief schemes 
reflected this concern with an emphasis on the provision of subsidies for transporting 
fodder and moving stock to agistment.   
 
A further argument for government intervention has related to the adverse impact of 
previous government policies.  In the 1860s and again after both World Wars, active 
policies of closer settlement were pursued for a variety of reasons.  Many of the farms 
established under these programs have proved to be too small to be sustainable in the face 
of declining farm terms of trade.  Advocates of drought support have suggested that 
governments have a moral obligation to assist farmers whose problems are not of their 
own making but are the result of poor past government policy.  
 
It seems to be the case that many of the rationales offered for drought support can be 





agrarianism or, in the Australian context, ‘countrymindedness’.  Although not explicitly 
stated, the agrarian image of agriculture as a virtuous and noble undertaking can be 
gleaned from a wide range of documents which discuss rural policy in general and 
drought policy in particular.   
 
In contradistinction to the above, there is perhaps an economic argument for Government 
intervention to farmers during drought that has some basis involving a possible form of 
market failure with respect to the delivery of credit to farm businesses.  The essential 
credit argument  used to support Government provision of financial assistance is that in 
some circumstances farmers have lost  the support of their financial institution  even 
though it is arguably the case that  that are in fact viable over the long term and require 
carry-on finance to see their businesses through short term difficulties.  This perspective 
underlay the early rural adjustment schemes and later schemes such as the Farm 
Household Support Scheme.  
 
 
Apart from the above possible reason, a bottom line is that drought policy is essentially 
politically motivated; the rationales for intervention are often little more than assertions 
made to support the case for assistance. Part of the issue is that Australian media is very 
urban focused with few reporters understanding the complexities of drought policy.  As a 
result, media reporting of droughts tends to be sensationalist, using stereotyped images of 
bare foot children, parched earth and dying sheep with little in depth analysis of the 
severity of the drought or the ability of farmers to manage its consequences.   
 
A range of reasons has been canvassed by farmers and their advocates for 
Commonwealth involvement in drought relief, ranging from the plausible to the highly 
dubious.  The removal of drought from the Natural Disaster Relief Arrangements ended 
the ‘natural disaster’ rationale but the Government continues to be persuaded, possibly by 
mostly political imperatives, that significant financial outlays are justified when there is a 
severe drought.  The next section discusses the problems with the policy responses to 
drought that have been implemented to date.  This is then followed by a discussion of an 
alternative approach. 
 
Problems with the Usual Approaches 
 
Australian governments have continued to grapple with the problem of developing an 
appropriate policy response to drought.  A number of related issues challenge policy 
makers: 
 
•  the question of the definition of drought;  
•  the high level of integration between the farm family and the farm business, 
which means that policy makers need to confront the issue of whether drought 
support should be directed at the whole farm unit or be limited to the farm 





•  the question of structural adjustment, which has important implications with 
respect to eligibility for drought support programs, ie whether support should only 
be available to farmers who are viable in the long-term.   
In addition to these issues troubling policy makers, we suggest that the question needs to 
be addressed with reference to financing , specifically whether more equitable approaches 
can be developed. 
 
The Definition of Drought 
 
There is no agreed definition of drought.  It can be meteorological, hydrological, 
agricultural and/or socio-economic (Wilhite and Glantz 1985, 113).  In essence, it is 
drought’s impact on human activities that is its most important feature — it is the result 
of a mismatch between demand for and supply of water (Dracup et al. 1980, 297;Wilhite 
2000, 16).  Australia’s National Drought Policy was based on the principle that farmers 
should manage the risk of drought as it is a normal feature of their operating 
environment.  Taken to its logical conclusion, such a construction of drought does not 
require drought declarations, as farmers adapt their management practices in response to 
the climatic conditions they face.   
 
However, the introduction of the exceptional circumstances concept meant that severe 
drought needed to be separated from so-called ‘normal’ drought events.  The first few 
declarations of exceptional drought were based on fairly subjective assessments of the 
severity of the drought.  By 1994, the Commonwealth and State governments moved to 
develop more objective, ‘scientific’ criteria for the declaration of exceptional droughts.  
In October 1994, the Ministerial Council agreed six core criteria which would be taken 
into account by Commonwealth and State/Territory governments in considering 
exceptional circumstances applications.  These criteria were: 
 
1. meteorological  conditions; 
2.  agronomic and stock conditions; 
3. water  supplies; 
4. environmental  impacts; 
5.  farm income levels; and 
6.  scale of the event. (ARMCANZ 1994, 3) 
 
The framework specified that a rare and severe drought was a ‘once-in-a-generation’ 
circumstance (ARMCANZ 1994, 8), with the meteorological situation as the threshold 
event.  In 1999, the Ministerial Council blurred the definitional issue by removing the 
primacy of meteorological criteria and agreeing that ‘Income becomes the key measure to 
determine the impact of the event, and whether assistance should be provided’ 
(ARMCANZ 1999, 59).   
 
The biggest issue encountered in the administration of the exceptional circumstances 
program has become known as the ‘lines on maps’ problem.  Since the 1992 National 
Drought Policy was announced, the focus has been on limiting drought support to those 





support schemes for farm businesses have also been budget limited so elements of 
rationing have occurred.   In order to determine eligibility, policy makers have identified 
geographic areas which are considered to be experiencing a severe downturn.  This 
inevitably has resulted in farmers on the margins of such areas being excluded from 
support when their situations are arguably indistinguishable from those of their 
neighbours.  To address this apparent inequity, the ministerial council agreed in August 
2001 that  
 
Farmers outside the defined zone, but who are in reasonable proximity and can 
also demonstrate that they are affected by the same exceptional events, will be 
eligible to make application under the same terms and conditions as those within 
the defined zone. (ARMCANZ 2001, 33) 
 
This decision has simply moved the lines and not removed the inequity. 
 
The absence of an adequate definition of ‘severe’ drought combined with the need to 
ration support through the imposition of geographic criteria suggests that a scheme which 
is not tied to a meteorological event may be more equitable in providing support to farm 
businesses in financial difficulty.  Such an approach is discussed below. 
 
 The Farm Family and the Farm Business 
 
Australian agriculture is dominated by the family farm.  Less than one percent of farm 
operations are incorporated (Wilson and Johnson 1997, 12), and there is a large number 
of small farms.  The top 20 per cent of farms produce 80 per cent of farm output (Wilson 
and Johnson 1997, 15).  In spite of recent attempts by governments to describe farmers as 
‘farm business managers’ (Crean 1992, 2412) and references to the ‘farm family 
business’ (Anderson 1997), it remains true of much of family farming in Australia that it 
is characterised by a ‘unity of business and household’ (Mauldon and Schapper 1974, 
65).  In recent years, governments have emphasised that farming is a business and have 
structured programs in pursuit of economic objectives.  The 1992 Rural Adjustment 
Scheme was focused on productivity improvement and its replacement, similarly focused, 
given the catchy title ‘FarmBis’.     
 
In spite of this, the unity of farm business and farm family is still strong and governments 
have struggled with the issue of whether support should be structured to recognise this 
unity or whether it should clearly separate household and business support.  In its 1990 
Report, the Drought Policy Review Task Force suggested that the government should 
treat the farm as a single entity by recommending that ‘[t]he income support needs of 
rural families in severe financial difficulties are appropriately addressed through the 
Rural Adjustment Scheme’ (DPRTF 1990, 27).  Only two years later, the consultants 
reviewing the Rural Adjustment Scheme gave the opposite advice (Synapse Consulting 
(Aust) Pty Ltd 1992, ix).  The government chose to follow the latter’s suggestion.  More 






Welfare assistance should not be delivered through instruments that assist 
businesses.  Such an approach confuses the objective of the intervention, does not 
effectively target the welfare problem and distorts market signals to farm 
businesses receiving assistance. (McColl, et al. 1997, 38) 
 
Attempts to separate family income support from farm business support, however, raise 
some issues for policy makers.  Australia’s general social welfare safety net is primarily 
focused on wage and salary owners and the asset-rich, income-poor status of farm 
families can exclude them, even when they qualify for support on all other criteria.  In 
general, welfare support in Australia is offered to those in need without regard to their 
future earning capacity.  People who access the unemployment benefit may later in life 
accumulate significant assets but this does not detract from their right to access income 
support when they are in need.  A similar approach should apply to farm families, 
however a discussion of such a scheme is beyond the scope of this paper. 
 
The question of business support is however, a different issue.  Traditionally disaster 
relief in Australia focused on the relief of personal hardship and the restoration of public 
assets to pre-disaster standards.  Recent policy approaches have shifted the emphasis 
more towards the preservation of private assets with schemes to provide interest rate 
subsidies to allow farmers to sustain their businesses during drought.  This raises some 
equity issues as, while it is undoubtedly true that farmers experiencing drought will be 
receiving low incomes, it is very unlikely to be the case that they are economically 
disadvantaged in a lifetime sense.  Many farmers in this situation are asset-rich, taking 
into account the value of their properties and, once the drought finishes,  they will be 
back on track although many will have received considerable financial benefits to help 
them through the trauma.   
 
The issues raised by the integration of farm business and farm family therefore relate to 
the equity of providing government support to asset-rich individuals during downturns; 
the business structures of many farms which enable farmers to ‘hide’ income and an 
emphasis on capital accumulation at the expense of income (Vincent et al. 1975, 86) 
which makes assessment of a farm family’s true income situation very difficult; and 
meeting the welfare needs of the farm family without undermining the Government’s 




One of the key principles guiding the policy-makers who developed the original drought 
policy in 1992 was that any response to drought should not undermine the structural 
adjustment process in agriculture (Botterill 2000). This principle extended to the 
provision of welfare support on the basis that untargeted income support could act as a 
subsidy to otherwise unviable businesses.  Although there is no empirical evidence to 
support this assumption, and in fact it may be groundless (Chudleigh, pers comm), it had 






The welfare component of the current exceptional circumstances program is decoupled 
from business performance, however, the interest rate subsidies currently available under 
exceptional circumstances conditions, now with a maximum of 50 per cent, continue to 
be available only to farmers who are considered viable in the long term. 
 
The National Drought Policy was structured in such a way as to ensure that drought 
support would be consistent with ongoing structural adjustment in the farm sector.  Its 
emphasis on risk management and the provision of support only to those with a viable 
future in the industry was designed to ensure that the principles of self reliance and 
ongoing productivity improvement were promoted.  Policy makers are concerned that 
drought support for marginal businesses can in fact keep them going.  If a farmer can 
make ends meet during good years and get support during bad years they can remain in 
farming even if their businesses are in poor shape.  Governments interested in structural 
adjustment would prefer to see these marginal properties change hands either through 
amalgamation or be taken on by better resource managers who will manage the farm 
more productively. 
 
Financing Drought Relief 
 
Although the point is not given much coverage in discussions of drought policy, a critical 
issue is to recognise that government outlays for drought relief have to be financed in 
some way and that public sector subsidies are paid for from tax revenue. This means that 
all taxpayers are contributing to drought relief, and this raises the critical equity point 
related to farm assets.  The vast majority of taxpayers do not own significant 
wealth-producing assets, meaning that it is likely that most of those paying for drought 
relief will be less advantaged over their lifetimes relative to the farmers being assisted.   
 
There is a different way of looking at this issue. It is the recognition that all public sector 
outlays have an opportunity cost in terms of alternative possible expenditures. Thus for 
any given level of taxation, dollars allocated to grants-based drought relief could be spent 
instead on social security, or for health, or for income distribution. It is likely that the vast 
majority of alternative uses of the funds are more progressive than current drought 
assistance arrangements. n other words, from the point of view of either taxation or 
spending, grants to drought-stricken farmers are very likely to be regressive in a 
life-cycle context: they redistribute income away from those with less wealth on average. 
 
Moreover, grants-based schemes are expensive.  For example, in the three years 1993-94 
to 1995-96, the Commonwealth Government in nominal dollars spent in excess of 
$210 million on exceptional circumstances interest subsides with a further $82 million in 
1994-95 and around $130 million in 1995-96 outlaid on the Drought Relief Payment 
(DPIE Annual Reports 1993-1996).  It is worth noting that these aggregate figures 
disguise  significant grants to individual farm operators.  The average  grant received by 
way of an exceptional circumstances interest rate subsidy in 1994-95 was a little over 
$17,365.  Treasury has estimated that the 2002 drought could cost the Commonwealth 






Because of the regressivity associated with the nature of drought financing, the case for a 
drought relief subsidy seems to be weak. However, it seems obvious that political 
considerations imply that governments will continue to want to offer support in some 
form to drought-affected farmers. The critical issue then concerns the nature and form of 
this intervention.  
 
An Alternative Approach: Income Related Borrowing 
 
In essence, a government providing grants-based drought assistance faces unpalatable 
choices. The first, high levels of assistance, is expensive and inequitable with respect to 
the relative economic circumstances of those providing the subsidy. Second,  low levels 
of coverage means that there are necessarily a large number of farms in need of help but 
not receiving any and there will be the arbitrary rules defining eligibility. This last, 
implies that some properties experiencing drought-related  hardship will receive no 
assistance at the same time that other properties in the same circumstances will be 
eligible for considerable support.  
 
The following sets out an alternative approach to drought support.  In line with recent 
trends in government policy, it suggests the separation of the farm business from the farm 
family and as such, focuses only on the support needs of the business.  It attempts to 
address a number of the problems of current policy settings by rejecting the need for 
drought declarations and ‘lines on maps’ to determine eligibility.  It also accepts the risk 
management approach underpinning recent drought responses.   
 
The suggested approach offers improved forms of drought relief with respect to the above 
issues under the presumption that drought assistance will remain a significant aspect of 
agricultural economic policy in the near future. Thus the following is simply a possible 
alternative instrument for achieving the objectives of the National Drought Policy while 
addressing some of the equity problems inherent in the current approach.  
  
Income Related Borrowing: Conceptual Issues 
 
The proposal  builds on the risk management approach to drought pursued by 
governments since 1989.  As part of that general strategy farmers have the capacity to 
build financial reserves in preparation for drought through the Farm Management Deposit 
scheme which provides a mechanism and tax incentives for farmers to prepare in advance 
for downturns such as drought.  However, for those circumstances which are prolonged 
and for which the farmer has acquired inadequate reserves, or for farmers new to the 
industry who have not had time to build reserves, an additional policy instrument seems 
to be desirable.  
 
The approach outlined below has been motivated by the view that there are major 
advantages associated with the use in public policy of government based income related 
loan policies. The first international policy of this type was Australia’s Higher Education 
Contribution Scheme (HECS), introduced in 1989 as a response to university funding 





While the basic motivation for HECS might seem to be a long distance from drought 
relief, there are remarkable similarities between the two areas. To assist understanding it 
is useful to describe the conceptual basis of student financing and in so doing make 
explicit comparisons with drought relief policy. 
 
Governments face three broad options with respect to the financing of university 
education. Of great interest is that many of the consequences  of each of the three 
approaches apply also to drought relief policy. This is now illustrated.  
A no charge system 
A university education could be offered to academically eligible students without charge, 
and this was essentially the nature of the Australian system from 1974 to 1989. Such an 
approach is very much in the flavour of current drought relief grants, in that assistance is 
offered to drought eligible farmers without charge. 
 
There are two basic problems with having a ‘free’ university charging arrangement. The 
first is that such a system is highly regressive in a life cycle context. Because ‘free’ 
means financed by all taxpayers, the vast majority of whom will not have had the 
privilege of a university education and who will in general experience over their lives far 
lower incomes than the graduates they have financed (Chapman 1997;Wran Committee 
1988).  
 
The second problem with not charging for higher education is that governments will 
often find themselves unable or unwilling to finance further expansions of the university 
system; budgets are, after all, limited. In the late 1980s this was a major problem for 
Australian higher education. Many academically eligible prospective students were 
denied a university education because the Commonwealth government was not prepared 
to provide the funding necessary to allow an expansion in the number of places to 
accommodate the excess demand (Wran Committee 1988). 
 
It is remarkable that both of the problems associated with not charging for university 
education are present in different forms with respect to grants-based drought relief. That 
is, such an arrangement is essentially regressive in that subsidies are provided by 
relatively asset-poor taxpayers to relatively asset-rich farms. As well, it is clear that 
drought outlays are insufficient to provide relief to all eligible farms because, as is the 
case with university financing, policy-makers have judged that there are not sufficient 
taxpayer resources available to assist all those in need. 
Leaving the System to the Market 
Instead of providing university education free of charge, governments could leave the 
system to the market and allow universities to charge fees with no public sector financial 
assistance being offered to poor students. However, in such a circumstance prospective 
students with no access to finances will face enrolment barriers, for two reasons.  
 
First, the commercial banking system will be unwilling to provide loans. The basic 





the case for loans for housing mortgages, in the event of default the bank is unable to 
cover its losses through the sale of collateral – slavery is, after all, illegal. This ‘capital 
market failure’ on the supply side is the basic reason that governments intervene in the 
provision of student finances. 
 
Second, some potential students – particularly those with uncertain prospects – may be 
very reluctant to commit themselves to repaying loans to banks (even if such loans are 
available). If the future turns out to be poor, borrowers will have repayment obligations 
which might be hard to meet, or can only be met under duress. If hardships result in 
default, there will be major adverse implications for a former student’s credit reputation 
and thus access to future borrowing. In short, ‘leaving the system to the market’ won’t 
work. 
 
These commercial bank financing problems are arguably faced also with respect to 
agricultural credit provision. That is, under some risky circumstances banks will be 
unwilling to lend to tide a farm over and/or help finance a farm’s recovery. Unlike the 
case for investments in human capital  however, banks will have access to collateral to 
sell in the event of default; but if the drought persists the bank may believe – perhaps 
accurately – that the value of the property is not such as to cover the risks and 
transactions costs of the loan. 
Income Related Loans 
A third broad approach to university financing involves the use of income related loans, 
and this is the method used in Australia (and increasingly, a large number of other 
countries). In 1989 HECS was introduced to address the university funding problems 
associated with either not having a charge, or of leaving the system to the market.  
 
The defining characteristic of HECS is that university charges are paid if and only when a 
former student’s income exceeds a given threshold; at that time this threshold was 
average earnings. There is a critical issue associated with having an income contingent 
aspect to a loan. This is that if repayments depend on future success, it becomes very 
likely that the arrangement is associated with no risk of default for the borrower. And it is 
this absence of default risk that seems to be the reason that HECS has not been associated 
with the erection of barriers to university participation by the poor (Chapman 1997). 
  
It is also instructive in the case of HECS that administrative costs of collection have 
turned out to be small, at less than half of one per cent of current revenue. This is because 
the Australian Tax System is very efficient. How such a scheme might work in the 
context of farm incomes is not completely clear, however, and is considered further 
below. 
 
A HECS-type system replacing grants-based drought relief has the following advantages. 
First, it means that the assistance is not regressive. Farmers will have been helped to 
sustain their businesses when they needed such help, with potentially low burdens only 





government will be able to afford to offer support to the vast majority of farmers in 
trouble. This will avoid the charge and reality of arbitrary rules with respect to eligibility.   
 
There may be no sound reasons why the scheme could not be generally available to 
farmers at all times and not be linked to drought declarations.  Such a scheme would be 
consistent with the principle that drought is a normal part of Australia’s climate and 
would contribute to the removal of a ‘disaster’ approach to drought support.  
 
Income Related Borrowing for Drought Relief: Implementation Issues 
 
Repayment of the Higher Education Contributions Scheme (HECS) debt is triggered 
when the former student’s taxable income reaches a threshold.  This mechanism works 
because the majority of graduates find employment as wage and salary earners and it is 
relatively straightforward for the Australian Tax Office to determine when the repayment 
threshold is triggered and to collect the repayments.  Taxable income is a good measure 
of the former student’s actual income situation. 
 
In the case of farms, the situation is more complex.  The true financial situation of the 
family farm is difficult to determine due to the blurring of business and family 
expenditure.  Johnson explains: 
 
First many household expenditures such as housing costs, may have been paid 
wholly or in part by the business so there is an unidentified in-kind source of 
income; second many businesses may receive tax discounts on expenditures that 
apply to their households as well as to their business; third businesses may have 
the opportunity to average income over several years so that negative income may 
be recorded, and finally the structure of the business may involve more than one 
income unit making attribution of income difficult. (Johnson 1996, 53) 
 
These perquisites of farming combined with the opportunities within the tax system for 
the self-employed to find deductions mean that taxable income is a misleading indicator 
of actual income (Vincent, et al. 1975, 76). The bottom line is that an income contingent 
loans scheme for drought relief should not use taxable income as the basis for collection 
of the loan. Instead it would appear to be much more preferable to use a measure of total 
revenue, such as gross sales, or of profits, such as gross operating surplus (the difference 
between total revenue and total costs), and to impose a flat percentage levy in periods 
following the borrowing.  
 
The former measure is collected for the Business Activity Statement for GST purposes, 
and is thus available on a quarterly basis. Gross operating surplus would have to be 
calculated and reported in an additional line, but available information suggests that this 
would not be difficult. In an Appendix we consider in detail the major collection issues, 
and how they might be addressed. 
 
The use of revenue or gross operating surplus as the basis for loan collections is not ideal, 





level of farm material welfare; for example, in difficult times involving the sale of assets. 
Consequently, to help insure against such exigencies, it is proposed that the levy be a low 
proportion only, perhaps a maximum of 5 per cent and/or have a ceiling on the level of 
repayments in any one year.  
 
A second major issue concerns the rate of interest on such loans. One approach would be 
to have the real rate of interest set at zero; that is, adjusting the debt only for inflation. 
Compared to a real rate of interest, the scheme would have two properties: insurance 
against the size of the debt escalating in times of continuing adversity; and an implicit 
subsidy from taxpayers as the government would be losing the opportunity cost of the 
funds for each period in which the debt remained unpaid. 
 
Alternatively, the scheme could be designed in a way that implicitly imposes a broad rate 
of interest, as HECS currently does. Specifically, students choosing to pay a HECS debt 
up-front receive a 25 per cent ‘discount’, which is equivalent to repaying nominally an 
additional one third of the debt. An illustrative example is that farmers borrowing say, 
$10,000, would agree to repay, say $13,000. Given that apart from this there would be no 
additional real rate of interest, the monies recovered would come at around no cost to the 
budget. The extent of the subsidy is, however, ultimately a decision of government. 
 
Third, as is the case with HECS, a trust fund could be set up in which loan repayments 
were hypothecated to be used only to help finance additional agricultural credit outlays. 
Over the longer term this arrangement has the advantage of demonstrating the net 
benefits to government of moving away from a grants-based system towards a more 
equitable and affordable drought assistance system. 
 
Finally, such a scheme need not necessarily be financed directly from the budget. That is, 
it might be possible and useful to have the revenue provided by commercial banks, with 
the government contracting to repay the financial institution in the knowledge that the 
revenue will eventually be forthcoming to the public sector from farms. This is precisely 




Our research suggests that this scheme is a simple, cost-effective means for delivering 
drought relief to farm businesses.  Its strengths seem clear: 
 
•  It is consistent with the National Drought Policy which has been in place since 
1992 and which enjoys broad bipartisan support. 
•  It builds on an approach of self-reliance and risk management, allowing farmers 
to manage the risk of drought over the lifetime of their involvement in agriculture. 
•  It can be implemented in such a way to decouple support from drought events 
entirely to reinforce the reality that Australia has a highly variable climate and 





•  It addresses many of the equity issues associated with existing policy, ie between 
farmers either side of the boundaries delineating drought and non-drought areas, 
between good managers and poor managers, and  between farmers and the non-
farm community. 
•  It addresses the problem of regressivity associated with the provision of subsidies 
by all taxpayers. 
As Australia experiences another El Niño episode, drought is once again on the public 
agenda.  It is therefore timely to consider alternative policy instruments which are 
arguably effective in relieving farmers’ financial difficulties but avoid many of the 
inequities inherent in the measures that have been applied to date.  A HECS-type model 
of revenue related loans has the potential to provide governments with a fair  and 









A Revenue Related Loan: Collection Issues 
 
 
What now follows explores some administrative issues with respect to the collection of a 
revenue related loan for a farm business. These are addressed through consideration of 
particular examples where there is apparent potential to avoid repayment. It is assumed 
that the scheme is only available to registered entities able to supply an ABN for GST 
purposes, and a tax file number for taxation purposes. A typical example of how the 
scheme might work is first explained. 
 
An existing ongoing business makes an application for funding on an approved 
application form containing ABN, personal details of the applicant including tax file 
numbers of the registered trading entity and associated individuals, and profit and loss 
and trading statements and balance sheets to enable determination of trigger repayment 
points. 
 
The registered entity receives a loan and information concerning repayment obligations 
(such as, at 2 per cent of revenue for periods following borrowing). The ATO is advised 
and the loan is recorded against a particular ABN.  
 
The entity has a succession of good seasons resulting in high levels of gross income and 
profits. GST returns are lodged quarterly and the loan commences to be repaid. (There 
may be a need to consider the inclusion of an additional line on the GST return for those 
entities that receive a loan. Presumably, the lodgement of the GST return for 1 quarter 
would trigger a predetermined and pre-printed repayment amount on the subsequent 




As for the above, except that after three years of loan repayments, the owners decide to 
sell the business or farm. One way to cover this would involve the requirement that in the 
event of a sale the loan would have to be repaid in full. Note that the ABN is unique to 
the registered entity, not the business. 
 
As with all sales of businesses, farms etc, there are certain searches carried out by legal 
practitioners acting for both the buyer and the seller. An ABN search could become one 
of these for rural property owner.  If the search revealed the existence of a loan, the legal 
profession is empowered to withhold and remit funds at settlement to satisfy the loan.  
Alternatively, an additional box could be added to the GST return, which would be 
required to be ticked/ left blank depending on the sale of a property or business.  An 










As for the normal case, but after 3 years the ownership of the registered entity changes 
(that is, a new shareholder comes into the company, a new partner is admitted to a 
partnership, or a partner in a partnership retires). 
 
The change to the shareholding of a company, which has an existing loan under this 
scheme, will have no impact. The company will still retain the same ABN. 
 
The re-constitution of a partnership is different, since a change in a partnership means a 
new ABN. Applications to change must address the question “did the partnership arise as 
a result of a re-constitution, that is, a change of partners?”. If the answer is “yes”, the 
TFN of the former partnership is required. This should be enough to alert the ATO to the 
existence of a loan, which may or may not require repayment.  For example, if a father 
retires from a partnership, but the sons continue, the loan might not need to be repaid but 




As for the typical case, except that after several years, the owners of the business pass 
away. Under their wills, the executors can either take over the business or sell it. 
 
If the business continues to run, there is no issue. However, if  the executors were to sell 







*The Appendix was prepared with Michael Egan from Hassall & Associates Pty Ltd. The 
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